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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark S. Wilbanks appeals from the district court's judgment summarily 
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. He asserts that the district court erred 
when it summarily dismissed a claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
when his attorney failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the alleged 
victim. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Following a jury trial, Mr. Wilbanks was found guilty of domestic violence with 
traumatic injury, misdemeanor domestic assault, and witness intimidation. He admitted 
to being a persistent violator, and received an aggregate sentence on the felonies of 
thirty years, with seven years fixed. (R., p.107.) Following an unsuccessful direct 
appeal, Mr. Wilbanks filed a verified petition for post-conviction relief, supported by an 
affidavit and a number of attached documents. {R., pp.4-72.) Among the claims raised 
in his petition was that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 
failed to conduct an adequate cross-examination of the complaining witness, including 
inquiring into previous, similar false accusations against Mr. Wilbanks which had 
occurred when she was also intoxicated1 (hereinafter, the claim).2 (R., pp.16, 66-71.) 
After the State filed an answer (R., pp.96-100), the district court issued a Notice of 
Intent to Dismiss, in which it explained that it intended to dismiss the claim for two 
1 The alleged victim had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.18 immediately after the 
incident in the underlying criminal case. (R., p.65.) 
2 Mr. Wilbanks raised a number of other claims, none of which is relevant on appeal. 
1 
reasons. First, it found that the claim should have been raised on direct appeal. 
Second, it concluded that the claim was based on a strategic decision of defense 
counsel which could not be challenged after the fact. (R., pp.115-18.) 
Mr. Wilbanks did not respond to the Notice, and the district court issued a 
Judgment Dismissing Application for Post-Conviction Relief "for the reasons set forth in 
the ... Notice of Intent to Dismiss." (R., p.120.) Mr. Wilbanks filed a Notice of Appeal 
timely from the judgment summarily dismissing his petition. (R., p.122.) 
2 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim? 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Wilbanks asserts that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his 
claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to 
conduct an adequate cross-examination of the complaining witness. Specifically, the 
district court erred when it concluded that the claim was waived because it should have 
been raised on direct appeal, and when it concluded that the claim concerned a 
strategic decision that could not be reviewed in post-conviction. Because neither 
reason for summarily dismissing the claim was correct, the judgment of dismissal 
should be vacated, and this matter remanded for an evidentiary hearing. 
8. Standards Of Review 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant 
in a criminal case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of 
counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984). Further, the 
Constitution guarantees a fair trial through its Due Process Clauses, but it defines the 
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth 
Amendment, including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
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the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. In light of the Sixth 
Amendment's reliance upon the legal profession's standards, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has stated that the starting point for evaluating criminal defense counsel's conduct is the 
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function. 
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,279 (1998). 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not altered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal proceeding 
would have been different, that decision would be "diametrically different," 
"opposite in character or nature," and "mutually opposed" to our clearly 
established precedent because we held in Strickland that the prisoner 
need only demonstrate a "reasonable probability that ... the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
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2. Summary Dismissal 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I.C. § 19-4903. 
The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its 
allegations, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
The court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I. C. § 19-4906(b ). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
where evidentiary facts are not disputed, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where State did not file a response to 
petition). However, where the facts are disputed, a court is required to accept the 
petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but it need not accept the petitioner's 
conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if a material issue 
of fact exists. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be held. Baldwin v. State, 145 
Idaho 148, 153 (2008). At the summary dismissal stage the petitioner need only 
present prima facie evidence of both prongs of Strickland. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 
567, 571 (2010). 
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When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Wilbanks' Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claim 
1. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed The Claim 
Because It Should Have Been Raised On Direct Appeal 
The first basis given for summarily dismissing Mr. Wilbanks' claim was that "the 
Petitioner should have raised his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct 
appeal because all of the claims were known to him at the time of the direct appeal." 
(R., p.115.) This was erroneous, as the law is clear that an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is not waived if it is not raised on direct appeal. See Matthews v. State, 
122 Idaho 801, 806 (1992) ("A defendant may raise the issue of ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial either on direct appeal or in a petition for post-conviction relief, but not 
both.") (emphases added). 
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2. The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Because The 
Claim Challenged A Strategic Decision 
The district court's other basis for summarily dismissing Mr. Wilbanks' claim was 
set forth as follows: 
Petitioner's allegations, as set forth in his Petition and his affidavit, amount 
to nothing more than a disagreement with his attorney's trial strategy. 
Disagreements with trial strategy do not establish that counsel's 
performance was deficient. Gabourie v. State, 125 Idaho 254, 260, 860 
P.2d 571, 577 (Ct. App. 1994). The fact that it was trial counsel's 
considered trial strategy to forgo inquiry into the victim's background - as 
opposed to inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or another 
shortcoming capable of objective evaluation - is supported by Petitioner's 
statement in his Affidavit. He writes: "On the day of trial, public defender 
said he wasn't able to get 'letter of recant' because it's not in existance 
[sic] no more," and "wasn't able to get the police records/medical records 
because prosecution warned him if I tried to bring up that information, the 
prosecution would get me convicted on being an ex-felon alone when I get 
on the stand." (Affidavit of Personal Knowledge of Facts, p.5, paragraph 
27.) 
According to Petitioner's own allegations, trial counsel considered 
Petitioner's request that counsel obtain certain evidence and made 
reasonable efforts to obtain that evidence; and, according to Petitioner's 
own allegations, trial counsel had strategic reasons why he did not pursue 
the course that Petitioner now advocates in hindsight. Petitioner's 
disagreement with his attorney's trial strategy does not constitute deficient 
performance. Even assuming that the facts Petitioner alleges are true, he 
has nevertheless failed to state a claim that his trial counsel's performance 
was deficient. 
(R., p.117 (emphasis and brackets in original) (footnote omitted).) 
From the portion of Mr. Wilbanks' statement quoted by the district court, it is 
possible to conclude that the reason for defense counsel's failure to conduct an 
adequate cross-examination of the alleged victim was a fear that the State would cross-
examine Mr. Wilbanks concerning prior felony convictions if he testified. Taking all 
inferences in Mr. Wilbanks' favor, as is required at the summary dismissal stage, this 
indicates that defense counsel made a tactical decision based on a potentially unlawful 
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threat by the prosecutor, as felony convictions are not automatically permissible 
grounds for impeachment. See I.RE. 609 (a prior felony conviction may be used to 
impeach a witness only if it occurred within the preceding ten years and "only if the court 
determines in a hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior 
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant to the credibility of 
the witness and that he probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect"). 
That the district court's dismissal of the claim on the belief that it represented a 
strategic decision rests on its assumption that the strategic decision was rational and 
not the result of ignorance of the law is evident from the fact that, in its Notice, it 
acknowledged that a strategic decision can form the basis for an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim when "it can be shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." (R., p.117 
n.5 (citing Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401 (Ct. App. 1989)). The district court's 
acknowledgment is well-taken in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's recognition that 
tactical decisions may serve as a basis for post-conviction relief where such decisions 
resulted from "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other 
shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008). 
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is governed by the 
same standard as summary judgment under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dunlap v. State, 146 Idaho 197, 199 (2008). Disputed facts are construed in favor of 
the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record 
are drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Idaho Tax 
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Comm'n, 142 Idaho 790, 793 (2006); see also Jensen v. State, 139 Idaho 57, 61 (2003) 
("This Court liberally construes the record in favor of the party opposing the motion for 
summary dismissal and draws any reasonable inferences and conclusions in that 
party's favor."). With those principles in mind, it is clear that the district court erred 
when, rather than drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Wilbanks, including 
an inference that defense counsel's strategic decision was based on ignorance of the 
law, it instead presumed that defense counsel's strategic decision was not the result of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings. As such, this 
Court should vacate the judgment of dismissal, and remand this matter for an 
evidentiary hearing on the claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Wilbanks respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand this matter for an evidentiary 
hearing on his claim. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 2013. 
SPENCER J.HAHN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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